諾獎經濟學家克魯格曼：特朗普爲何會輸掉貿易戰？

“His people don’t know what they’re doing or what they want”“他的團隊不知道該做什麼！需要什麼！”4月16日，諾獎經濟學家保羅·克魯格曼在Substack平臺發表文章，批評特朗普近期出臺的關於貿易、關稅等一系列政策，並且預測特朗普政府會輸掉與中國的貿易戰。保羅·克魯格曼（Paul R. Krugman），美國經濟學家。2008年獲諾貝爾經濟學獎。克魯格曼的主要研究領域包括國際貿易、國際金融、貨幣危機與匯率變化理論。在文章中，克魯格曼認爲懂王和他的團隊根本就不懂國際貿易，開門見山直述核心邏輯——國際貿易的核心不在於什麼你能賣，而是你能買到什麼。克魯格曼功成名就的經濟學研究方向是國際貿易，也算是偏向自由派的經濟學專家，他就不可能和川王尿一壺裡嗎？

克魯格曼對於川王的“U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.”——“貿易談判孤立中國的計劃”，並不認爲這個計劃能夠成功。他給出了四個原因，我以自己的理解簡要歸納羅列：

1、政治兒戲化，通過社交媒體發佈政策，前後不一致或自我否定。

2、孤立中國非一國之力，需要它國同進退，但川王政府讓美國國際聲譽落地，人家未必跟隨。

3、即便川王可信，從自身利益角度出發，歐盟也不會得罪中國破壞自己的供應鏈。

4、交易的核心在進口而非出口，出口的損失中國政府可以通過擴大內需彌補，但美國損失的關鍵進口品卻很難彌補。同時，有一方不用面臨選舉的壓力。

所以，克魯格曼認爲，川王對抗中國是蚍蜉撼樹，不對稱的戰爭

而更深層次的，克魯格曼從制度經濟學的角度，闡述了美國爲什麼在世界範圍內失去信任，是因爲目前美國的政治制度正在邁向獨裁，這個世界上廣泛的民主體制價值觀，背道而馳。因此現在沒有國家願意和美國結盟。

所以，文章段末的“collapse of democracy”並不是指民主制度本身的崩塌，而是指的美國的政治制度正在轉向。

當然，克魯格曼本身就是一個“大喇叭”，對於貿易戰，他不看好川王政府，並不意味着他就看好中國。比如去年他也發表了一篇文章“唱空”中國經濟，認爲中國經濟模式不可持續，尤其是高投資帶動的經濟發展，未來應該轉型爲以消費爲主的模式。

他也曾經寫文章質疑過中國經濟的未來發展：“中國經濟面對目前的困境，最顯而易見的解決辦法是將更多收入轉移到家庭，從生產端轉移到消費端，增加居民收入從而增強消費需求。但中國似乎奇怪地不願做這些顯而易見的事情，仍然專注於大量生產而非消費。”當時，國內也有很多經濟學專家批評他，其實平心而論，他對於中國的看法和預測，更多是基於他的經濟學理念，而非政治身份和意識形態。甚至關於中國經濟在投資和消費方面的，其實也是有一定的邏輯和道理。因此，我們可以通過克魯格曼的這篇文章，從第三方的視角，來審視這場由特朗普發起的貿易戰“鬧劇”的未來走勢。以下，爲英文原文及翻譯：

Scenes from the trade war:

In response to Donald Trump’s huge tariffs on Chinese exports, China’s government has suspended exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, both critical to many modern industries and the military

Trade talks between the United States and the European Union appear to have gone nowhere, with Maros Sefcovic, the EU’s top trade official, reportedly having “struggled to determine America’s aims.”

貿易戰的場景：

針對唐納德·特朗普對中國出口商品徵收高額關稅，中國政府已暫停出口稀土礦物和磁鐵，這兩種物質對衆多現代產業和軍事領域都至關重要。

據報道，美國和歐盟之間的貿易談判似乎毫無進展，歐盟首席貿易官員馬羅什·謝夫喬維奇“難以確定美國的目標”。

In other words, the Chinese, unlike the Trump administration, understand what trade and trade wars are about. And the Trumpers, in addition to not knowing what they’re doing, don’t even know what they want.

換句話說，中國與特朗普政府不同，他們明白貿易以及貿易戰是怎麼回事。而特朗普政府除了不知道自己在做什麼之外，甚至都不清楚自己想要什麼。

Here’s what Trump and his sycophants don’t understand about international trade: It’s not about what you can sell, it’s about what you can buy.

特朗普及其他的馬屁精，對國際貿易一竅不通：國際貿易的核心邏輯不在於你能賣什麼，而在於你能買什麼。

Think for a minute about the finances of individuals. Why do people work? Not to be able to boast that they ran trade surpluses with their employers — “Hey, they paid me a lot, and I hardly bought anything from them.” No, people sell their labor so that they can afford to buy stuff.

思考一下我們的個人財務。人們爲什麼要工作呢？不是爲了吹噓自己作爲勞動者和老闆之間的“貿易順差”——“嘿，老闆們付給了我相當多的薪酬，然而我們卻沒有從他們那裡買任何東西”。人們出售自己的勞動力，是爲了購買商品。

The same is true for countries. Importing what you want — being able to get stuff from other countries — is the purpose of international trade. Exporting — sending stuff to other countries — is something we do so we can pay for imports.

國家之間的道理同樣如此。進口你所需要的——能夠從其他國家購買商品——這是國際貿易的目的。出口——賣給其他國家（得到外匯）——這樣我們才能夠購買進口商品。

OK, in practice there’s a bit more to the story, as I’ll explain below, but the complications don’t change the fundamental proposition that the benefits from international trade basically come from being able to import goods that would be expensive or impossible to produce at home. Think hydroelectric power from Canada.

當然，現實中的貿易比理論要複雜，我將在下文進行的解釋。然而，不管再複雜，其基本邏輯是沒有變的，即國際貿易的好處是，能夠進口昂貴，或者是不能在國內生產的商品。 想想來自加拿大的水力發電。

This fundamental reality explains why serious analyses of Trump’s trade war with China often conclude that China, not America, has the upper hand.

這一基本現實解釋了，爲什麼那些關於特朗普與中國的貿易戰的嚴肅分析，往往得出的結論是，中國，而不是美國，佔了上風。

Yesterday the Financial Times had a mostly good writeup of the stakes, which pointed out that US exports to China are “heavily focused on agriculture.” The FT said that these goods are “low value-added,” which I’m not sure is true — U.S. farming is highly productive and highly capital-intensive. But what matters in a trade war is the fact that China can fairly easily find other agricultural suppliers, buying soybeans from Brazil instead of Iowa.

昨天，《金融時報》對利害關係進行了大量報道，指出美國對中國的出口“主要集中在農業上”。 英國《金融時報》表示，這些商品是“低附加值”的，我不確定這是真的——美國農業生產力高，資本密集型高。 但在貿易戰中，重要的是，中國可以很容易地找到其他農業供應商，從巴西購買大豆替代從愛荷華州。

By contrast, the United States will have a hard time replacing many of the goods it imports from China. Furthermore, many of the goods we buy from China are industrial inputs rather than consumer goods.

相比之下，美國將很難找到原本從中國進口商品的替代品。 此外，我們從中國購買的許多商品都是工業投入，而不是消費品。

So Trump has started a trade war that will disrupt our own supply chains. Remember Covid and its immediate aftermath? Remember how shortages spread through the economy and fueled inflation? Those days are about to come back, inflicting especially large damage on the manufacturing sector Trump claims he will revive.

因此，特朗普發動了一場貿易戰，這將擾亂我們自己的供應鏈。還記得新冠肺炎及其直接後果嗎？ 還記得短缺是如何在經濟中蔓延和助長通貨膨脹的嗎？ 那些日子即將捲土重來，尤其是對特朗普聲稱他將復興的製造業，將造成了特別大的損害。

Is the U.S. economy at China’s mercy? No. America remains a highly productive nation that could cope with even severe economic shocks if it had smart, clear-headed leadership. But we don’t.

美國經濟受中國擺佈嗎？不。美國仍然是一個生產力強國，甚至能夠應對嚴重的經濟衝擊。但前提是這個國家領導者具備聰明、清醒的頭腦。但我們沒有。

True, today’s Wall Street Journal has an article with the headline “U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.” So you might think that there’s an actual strategy out there. But I don’t believe it, for four reasons.

誠然，今天的《華爾街日報》有一篇標題爲“美國計劃利用貿易談判來孤立中國”的文章。所以你可能會認爲有一個切實的政策落地。但我並不相信，主要有四個原因。

First, this story was clearly leaked by Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, or people close to him. In a normal administration this kind of supposedly inside scoop would offer valuable insights into the policy process. But one thing that’s clear about Trump tariffs is that there is no policy process. Individual officials — Bessent, Peter Navarro, Howard Lutnick — keep floating policy ideas in public, hoping that putting them out there will somehow create facts. But a day or two later another official will go on TV, or Trump will post something on Truth Social, completely contradicting what the last official said.

第一，這個故事顯然是由財政部長斯科特·貝森特或他身邊的人泄露的。 在正常政府中，這種所謂的內幕消息將爲政策過程提供寶貴的見解。但問題是特朗普的關稅政策的制定根本就沒有一個正常的流程。別官員——貝森特、彼得·納瓦羅、霍華德·盧特尼克——一直在公共場合傳播政策想法，希望將它們放在那裡會以某種方式創造事實。 但一兩天後，另一位官員將上電視，或者特朗普將在Truth Social上發佈一些東西，這與上一位官員的說法完全矛盾。

So what we’re hearing about Bessent isn’t really a scoop about Trump policy, it’s almost surely an attempt by Bessent to influence policy. And there’s no reason to believe that he’s actually in charge.

因此，我們聽到的關於貝森特的信息並不是關於特朗普政策的獨家新聞，幾乎可以肯定這是貝森特影響政策的企圖。沒有理由相信他真的是負責人。

Second, even if U.S. negotiators are trying to cut deals with other countries that would isolate China, they will be unlikely to succeed because Trump has lost all credibility. After all, you can’t make deals with other countries unless foreign governments believe that you will honor the agreements you make. Trump has already destroyed U.S. credibility on that front, ripping up all our existing trade agreements, then making wild changes in his own tariffs every few days.

第二，即使美國談判代表試圖與其他國家達成孤立中國的協議，他們也不太可能成功，因爲特朗普已經失去了所有的信譽。畢竟，除非外國政府相信你會遵守你達成的協議，否則你不能與其他國家達成協議。特朗普已經破壞了美國在這方面的信譽，撕毀了我們現有的所有貿易協議，然後每隔幾天就大幅改變自己的關稅。

Third, even if Trump’s promises were credible, why would a European government want to join America’s trade war with China, destroying its own supply chains? If the argument is that it’s worth paying the cost of ruined supply chains because that will protect you from Trump’s tariffs, who trusts Trump not to reimpose punitive tariffs on our supposed allies the next time he thinks they’re looking at him funny?

第三，即使特朗普的承諾是可信的，歐洲政府爲何要加入美國與中國的貿易戰，而摧毀自己的供應鏈呢？ 如果理由摧毀自己的供應鏈是值得的，因爲這將保護自己免受特朗普的關稅政策的脅迫，那麼當下次他認爲歐洲國家在看他笑話的時候，誰會相信特朗普不會對這些所謂的盟友重新徵收懲罰性關稅？

Fourth, the Trump administration is bringing a knife to a gun fight.

第四，特朗普政府這是在用小刀對抗火槍。

To the extent that there’s a real plan to confront China, it appears to center on reducing China’s ability to sell abroad. It’s true that this will be painful for China’s export sector. As I said, my flat statement that trade is about imports, not exports, needs some qualification because the short-term interests of exporters can’t be ignored. But China can cope with lost exports by aiding affected industries, the same way Trump funneled money to farmers hurt by his first trade war. It can also offset any loss of export jobs by stimulating domestic demand.

在某種程度上，對抗中國行之有效的辦法，應集中在削減中國的海外銷售能力。這能夠切實地給中國出口部門帶來痛苦。正如我所說，我自己的淺見——貿易的關鍵是進口，而非出口，需要一些論證，因爲出口商的短期利益不能忽視。但是中國能夠通過對受影響的出口行業進行補助來彌補出口缺口，就像第一次貿易戰爭中特朗普對遭受損失的農民提供流動性資金。可以通過刺激內需來抵消出口工作崗位減少的損失。

So while China can manage the loss of exports in various ways, it will be much harder for America to cope with the loss of crucial inputs produced in China.

因此，雖然中國可以通過各種方式減少出口損失，但美國將更難應對來自中國生產的關鍵進口商品的損失。

The overall point is that even relatively sophisticated Trumpers like Bessent are still thinking in terms of Chinese access to the markets of the United States and our imagined trade war allies, when the real issue now is whether China can strangle the U.S. economy by disrupting our supply chains.

總體而言，即使是像貝森特這樣相對老練的特朗普團隊成員，仍然在考慮中國進入美國市場和我們想象中的貿易戰盟友，而現在真正的問題是中國能否通過擾亂我們的供應鏈來扼殺美國經濟。

PS: I know that I’m mixing metaphors here — China has brought a gun that is strangling us by cutting our supply chains. But you get my point.

PS：我知道我在這裡混淆了隱喻——中國帶來了一把槍，通過切斷我們的供應鏈來扼殺我們。但你們懂我的意思。

Furthermore, America’s ability to fight a trade war is severely damaged by our descent into authoritarian rule. A few months ago other advanced countries might have been inclined to take our side because of shared democratic values. Now we’ve become a country whose government claims the right to kidnap people whenever it likes and ship them to foreign gulags. Who wants to be allied with such a government? Who will trust such a government to keep its word on anything?

此外，美國打貿易戰的能力因我們陷入專制的統治而受到嚴重損害。幾個月前，由於共同的民主價值觀，其他發達國家可能傾向於站在我們一邊。現在，我們已經成爲一個政府聲稱有權隨時綁架人並將他們運往外國“古拉格集中營”的國家。誰願意與這樣的政府結盟？ 誰會相信這樣的政府會信守諾言？

Of course, the fact that the collapse of democracy will contribute to our defeat in the trade war isn’t the main reason to be horrified at where we are. Losing real GDP is bad, but it’s much less important than losing our soul. As it happens, however, we seem to be on track to do both.

當然，民主的崩潰將導致我們在貿易戰中的失敗，這一事實並不是我們對現狀感到驚訝的主要原因。失去GDP固然是一件壞事，但失去立國之本更爲重要。然而，碰巧的是，這兩者正同時發生着。